Referring expressions and structural language abilities in children with specific language impairment: A pragmatic tolerance account by Davies, C et al.
 1 
 
This paper was accepted on 20/11/2015 and will appear as: 
 
Davies, C., Andrés-Roqueta, C. & Norbury, C.F. (2016) Referring expressions and structural 
language abilities in children with Specific Language Impairment: A pragmatic tolerance 
account. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology.   
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Specific language impairment (SLI) has traditionally been characterised as a deficit of 
structural language (specifically grammar), with relative strengths in pragmatics. In this 
study, comprehensive assessment of production, comprehension and metalinguistic 
judgment of referring expressions reveals that children with SLI have weaknesses in both 
structural and pragmatic language skills relative to age-matched peers. Correlational 
analyses highlight a relationship between their performance on the experimental tasks and 
their structural language ability. Despite their poor performance on the production and 
comprehension tasks, children with SLI were able to recognise pragmatically under-
informative reference relative to other types of utterance, though imposed a less severe 
penalty on such expressions than their typically-developing peers; a pattern which supports 
the pragmatic tolerance account. Our novel methodology (which probes structural abilities 
from both the speaker’s and hearer’s perspectives as well as metalinguistic and pragmatic 
skills in the same sample) challenges the assumption that pragmatic errors stem from 
deficits in social cognition and instead supports recent findings suggesting that when the 
impact of structural language is isolated, pragmatic deficits may be resolved. 
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Reference is a central communicative skill in which speakers must identify the entity 
they wish to talk about and recognise how to describe the referent in a way that will 
unambiguously identify the intended referent for the listener. Thus, successful reference 
requires integrating cognitive, linguistic and social-pragmatic skills in order to scan the visual 
scene, identify distinctive features of the target relative to other potential referents, take 
account of previous and concurrent linguistic and environmental context, understand the 
listener’s perspective and knowledge state, provide sufficient detail to disambiguate similar 
items, and then produce a felicitous referring expression (Ariel, 1990; Chafe, 1976; Clark & 
Bangerter, 2004; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). For 
example, an optimally-informative speaker should refer to ‘the small apple’ when there are 
two apples of different sizes in the context; ‘apple’ alone is under-informative in the given 
context and creates ambiguity and potential for communicative breakdown.   
Although the development of reference in typically developing children has been 
researched extensively since the 1960s (for reviews see Dickson, 1982 and Graf & Davies, 
2014), the development of referential communication in clinical populations in which 
component skills such as language or social-pragmatics may be compromised has been 
under-researched. This is particularly so for children with specific language impairments 
(SLI), although such children may provide crucial evidence about the underlying skills 
associated with successful reference. SLI is a common developmental condition, diagnosed 
when children fail to develop aspects of structural language, e.g. phonology, vocabulary and 
syntax, despite meeting other developmental milestones (Norbury & Paul, 
2013).  Traditionally, children with SLI were considered to have strengths in pragmatic 
language skills, or the use of language for social communication purposes, relative to their 
structural language abilities. In general, deficits in social-cognition are not thought to 
characterise SLI (van der Lely, 1997) and their conversational skills are typically appropriate 
to context (Bishop & Adams, 1991). However, more recent investigations have highlighted 
delays in social-cognitive understanding (Andrés-Roqueta, Adrian, Clemente, & Katsos, 
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2013), lower ratings of pragmatic language competence (Norbury, Nash, Baird, & Bishop, 
2004), and deficits in pragmatic tasks that require analysis of linguistic context, for example, 
inferencing and ambiguity resolution (Norbury, 2005a,b). In general, the pragmatic skills of 
children with SLI are reported to be commensurate with their overall level of linguistic 
competence (cf. Norbury, Nash, Baird, & Bishop, 2004). This highlights the importance of 
structural language skills in both solving pragmatic language tasks, and potentially in 
developing social-pragmatic awareness. In addition, investigations into the pragmatic 
language skills of children with SLI may elucidate sources of pragmatic breakdown in other 
developmental populations, such as autism spectrum disorder.  
The current study thus aims to examine reference skills in SLI using a novel and 
comprehensive paradigm probing production, comprehension and metalinguistic abilities and 
to explore the potential origins of pragmatic deficit in reference by examining the relationship 
between our novel tasks and standardised language tests. Reference is a potentially fruitful 
arena to test the pragmatic skills of children with SLI, as the pragmatic element of this task 
draws more on an understanding of the listener’s knowledge state, rather than an 
appreciation of linguistic context. Therefore, reference taps a strength in pragmatic 
understanding as distinct from structural language abilities in this population. This study also 
extends the literature by testing pragmatic skills in non-English speaking children with SLI. 
 
Typical and Atypical Development of Reference 
Children typically develop adult-like abilities to spontaneously produce unambiguous 
referring expressions in simple contexts by approximately six years of age (Dickson, 1982; 
Girbau, 2001; Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007). It has been suggested that their 
production of under-informative referring expressions prior to this age is due to a lack of 
awareness of other potential targets in the environment (Whitehurst, 1976) or because they 
don’t realise that to refer means to implicitly describe differences that will eliminate potential 
ambiguity (Whitehurst & Sonnenschein, 1981). Likewise, in comprehension, children are 
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able to use the presence of modification to make early inferences about an intended target 
by five years of age (Huang & Snedeker, 2009), and will seek clarification of under-
informative expressions at around the same age (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002).  
Off-line studies have shown that the necessary metalinguistic skills for judging the 
adequacy of referring expressions are evident by age four (Nilsen & Graham, 2012; 
Morisseau, Davies, & Matthews, 2013). These studies elicited such abilities at earlier ages 
than in previous studies (e.g. Davies & Katsos, 2010; Robinson & Robinson, 1982) by using 
implicit rather than explicit measures of inadequacy detection. The Pragmatic Tolerance 
account (Katsos & Bishop, 2011) sheds light on this apparent disconnect through its 
discovery of methodological effects on pragmatic sensitivities. In studies of the development 
of scalar implicature, Katsos & Bishop (2011) found that although five- to six-year-old 
children appeared to be insensitive to violations of informativeness when they were required 
to straightforwardly accept or reject utterances, the same population performed well in 
picture-matching and action-based tasks. Furthermore, they penalised under-informative 
items when using a Likert scale of acceptability, suggesting that they are indeed sensitive to 
these types of pragmatic violation. These findings are taken as evidence that children do not 
lack overall competence with informativeness as comprehenders, but that their low 
performance on binary judgment tasks should be attributed to their tolerant attitude towards 
violations of pragmatic meaning when engaged in a forced choice judgment. 
Reference is vulnerable in neurodevelopmental disorders, for example, children with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show inappropriate use of linguistic markers of accessibility 
such as full nouns in place of pronouns (Arnold, Bennetto, & Diehl, 2009) and definite noun 
phrases in place of definite reference when introducing characters in narrative (Tager-
Flusberg, 1995). These and other pragmatic impairments have been attributed to concurrent 
deficits in social cognition (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Surian, Baron-Cohen, & van der Lely, 1996) 
and/or weak central coherence (Happé, 1997). However, identifying potential sources of 
pragmatic deficit is impeded by the variable cognitive and language profiles that characterise 
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ASD (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Norbury 2005a), meaning that the source of error is 
far from clear (Bishop, 1989).  
The fact that many children with SLI are challenged by pragmatic aspects of 
communication suggests structural language abilities as a potential contributor to pragmatic 
difficulty in ASD, at least for those children with ASD who present with concomitant language 
impairment (cf. Norbury, 2013). For instance, children with SLI are less skilled than age-
matched typically-developing (TD) peers at using contextual information to resolve lexical 
ambiguities and to understand metaphors due to their low vocabulary skills (Norbury, 
2005a,b). Similarly, Katsos, Andrés-Roqueta, Estevan, & Cummins (2011) reported that 
children with SLI were less likely than age-matched TD peers to reject under-informative 
quantifiers such as ‘some of the bananas are in the boxes’ when all of the bananas were in 
the boxes. Again, pragmatic language abilities in this study were in line with their overall low 
structural language abilities. These findings suggest that difficulties using linguistic context in 
SLI reflects inadequate semantic or syntactic knowledge, rather than an additional pragmatic 
deficit. Since reference involves the interplay of language competence with an 
understanding of others’ epistemic states, it is a useful test-bed for investigating these two 
spheres of ability.  
There are few experimental studies of referential abilities in SLI, and those that exist 
provide conflicting results. Bishop and Adams (1991) reported that children with SLI (aged 8-
12 years) achieved lower scores on a production measure of referential communicative 
adequacy relative to age-matched TD peers. Error patterns varied with age; 8-9 year-olds 
gave fewer discriminating features than peers, while the 10-12 year-olds provided more 
redundant information. In contrast, Johnston, Smith, and Box (1997) found no differences 
between 4-year-old children with SLI and age-matched TD peers and Reuterskiöld-Wagner, 
Nettelbladt, and Sahlén (2001) reported similar performance in 7 year-old children with SLI. 
However, qualitative analyses by Johnston et al (1997) revealed that children with SLI were 
less likely to refer to the targets as a set with attributes in common (e.g. ‘the green ones’), 
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adopting instead a more piecemeal referential strategy (e.g. “the green one and the green 
one”). The current study aims to clarify this rather mixed picture of referential abilities in SLI 
by investigating production, comprehension and judgement of reference in the same 
children. 
Relative to production and comprehension tasks, judgements of referring 
expressions arguably rely less on linguistic computation and more on pragmatic awareness 
of conversational adequacy, and may therefore reveal relative communicative strengths in 
children with SLI. Surian et al. (1996) investigated the detection of maxim violation by 
children with SLI and those with ASD matched for age and verbal ability. Both clinical groups 
were less sensitive to violations of the maxim of quantity relative to age-matched peers, 
accepting utterances that contained redundant information. Due to the wide variation in 
language ability in the ASD sample, clear conclusions cannot be made regarding the source 
of the pragmatic impairment in this study. It does however provide preliminary evidence of 
pragmatic difficulty in SLI in judging the optimal amount of information required to make 
referential choices. Similarly, in a study investigating awareness of inadequate messages, 
Meline & Brackin (1987) found that language-impaired children predominantly blamed the 
listener rather than the speaker for under-informative messages, whereas age-matched TD 
peers correctly blamed the speaker. 
 
Identifying the Source of Error in Referential Communication 
Findings to date suggest that children with SLI produce more inadequate referential 
expressions which may be both under- and over-informative, and are less likely to penalise 
or repair non-optimal utterances relative to age-matched peers. Identifying the source of 
these errors is challenged by the range of referential tasks employed and the variable ages 
of participants across studies. To address these issues, we explicitly compared production, 
comprehension and judgement of referential terms in the same participants. Furthermore, 
we examined the relationships between aspects of reference and performance on 
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standardised measures of language ability. This approach aims to clarify whether the locus 
of impaired referential ability in SLI lies in production/comprehension skills (i.e. due to a 
structural linguistic deficit), in problems recognising the need for sufficient information (i.e. 
due to a pragmatic deficit), or some combination of the two. 
We hypothesized that children with SLI would perform more poorly than TD peers on 
the production task and that their lower performance would be related to expressive 
language. With regard to comprehension, we predicted relatively few errors overall given the 
simple adjective/noun combinations used in the experiment, but nevertheless, children with 
SLI were expected make more errors associated with level of receptive language. In 
contrast, we predicted that children with SLI would perform comparably to TD peers on a 
judgement task that should more directly tap pragmatic abilities as distinct from linguistic 
competence. 
 
 
Method 
Participants and standardised tests 
Eighteen children with SLI aged 5;0 to 10;11 (11 males) and eighteen TD children 
(11 males) matched for chronological age and non-verbal reasoning abilities were recruited 
from the north-east region of Spain. Ethical permission was obtained from the Spanish 
Ministry of Culture, Education and Sports. Informed, written consent was obtained from 
parents and verbal assent was obtained from eligible children prior to assessment.  
Children with SLI met the following criteria: (i) diagnosis and on-going clinical 
involvement from a speech-language therapist; (ii) no sensorineural hearing loss, intellectual 
impairment, physical disability, or diagnosis of ASD; (iii) Spanish as first language; (iv) non-
verbal abilities within 1SD of normative mean on the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices 
(Raven, Raven and Court, 1998). Participants were also required to score -1SD or more on 
one or both of the standardized language assessments we ran, i.e. the Comprensión de 
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Estructuras Gramaticales (CEG; Mendoza, Carballo, Muñoz, and Fresneda, 2005); the 
Sentence Memory Recall subtest from the Evaluación del Lenguaje Infantil (ELI; Saborit and 
Julian, 2005). We also tested the children on the vocabulary sub-tests of the WISC-IV 
(Wechsler, 2003) in order to more comprehensively measure participants’ language ability, 
and to explore any relationship to their referential abilities. 
In addition to measuring participants’ language levels, we also assessed their false-
belief abilities as a proxy measure of social-cognitive skill. Two established tasks for 
evaluating first-order false beliefs were employed: 1) the Change of Location task (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983), in which children were asked to predict a third person’s behaviour based on 
her false belief (where will Sally look for the ball?). Control questions were asked to check 
that the participant remembered and understood the story, and pictures were provided to 
help the children’s understanding. 2) the Unexpected Contents task (Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer, 1987), in which children are asked to predict the behaviour of a third person based 
on the understanding of a false belief. As in the change of location task, control questions 
were asked to check that the participant remembered and understood the story, and props 
(Smarties tube and a pencil) were used to help the understanding. In both tasks, control 
questions and critical false-belief questions had to be answered correctly to pass the tasks. 
Participants were coded as ‘passers’ when they passed both false belief tasks and coded as 
‘failers’ when they failed one or both false belief tasks. The rationale for using these proxy 
measures was twofold: 1) to test whether the LI group showed impairments in one aspect of 
social cognition relative to their TD peers; 2) to provide a potential explanation for any 
impaired performance in produced informativeness (i.e. an inability to take an addressee’s 
perspective). Further, since there is evidence to suggest that children with SLI can pass 
these tests of false belief by seven years of age (Andrés-Roqueta et al., 2013; Farmer, 
2000), they should be within the reach of the children at the mean age of our clinical sample. 
TD children were recruited from the same schools as the children with SLI and 
pairwise matched by gender and age (within three months). Additionally, they had no 
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intellectual impairment or highly gifted background and spoke Spanish as their first 
language. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the group selection measures.  
 
 SLI (n=18) TD (n=18)    
 
Mean  
Range 
(SD) 
Mean  
Range 
(SD)     t p-value Cohen’s d 
Descriptive measures 
age (y;m) 7;4  
5;1 – 
10;9 
(1;10) 7;6 
5;0 – 
10;9 
(1;9) 
 
-.46 ns 
(p=.65) 
0.15 
Non-verbal reasoning 
Raven matrices 21.94 
14-34 
(6.14) 
 
25.05 
15-34 
(6.74)  -1.45 ns 
(p=.16) 
0.48 
Linguistic measures 
receptive grammar 51.27 
36-68 
(8.67) 
 
66.16 
39-78 
(8.73)  
 
-5.12 <.001 1.71 
expressive 
grammar 
6.05 
4-9 
(1.55) 
 
8.27 
4-9 
(1.17) -4.83 <.001 1.62 
vocabulary 17.05 
2-40 
(8.94)  
 
25.44 
8-41 
(8.89) -2.82 <.01 0.94 
Theory of Mind measures 
false belief 
(passers/failers) 
 
10/8 
 
 
 
12/6 
 Chi-
squared 
χ(1) = 
0.468 
 ns  
(p=.49) 
 
 
Table 1. Scores on background measures. All scores reported as raw scores. 
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Experimental Procedure 
Children were assessed in school over three sessions. Language and cognitive skills 
were assessed in the first session, the production task was completed in the second, and the 
comprehension and judgement tasks in the third, with an average of two weeks between 
assessment sessions. The experimental tasks were developed from a similar paradigm used 
by Davies and Katsos (2010), which had successfully provided a comprehensive 
measurement of referential ability in TD children and adults. The stimuli were created 
especially for this study, were equally visually salient, and all objects were familiar to 
children. 
Production task. Participants sat facing a computer screen, with one experimenter 
(E1) sitting to their left and another (E2) on their right. Greyscale drawings of four everyday 
objects were displayed in each quadrant (Figure 1). Participants received a booklet 
containing the same on-screen displays with the target highlighted in red (visible only to the 
participant), and were instructed to ask E2 to click the image on the computer screen that 
matched the target image in their book. Four practice items were followed by 32 
experimental items. Utterances were audio recorded for transcribing and coding off-line. 
 
Figure 1. Example arrays for production and comprehension/judgement task; a) no-contrast 
condition, b) contrast condition, c) experimental set-up for production task (upper display 
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represents computer screen; lower display represents picture booklet visible only to the 
participant (P) and E1). 
 
 
Comprehension and judgement tasks. This task was designed to test (i) 
participants’ comprehension of utterances containing simple referring expressions and (ii) 
their metalinguistic judgment of felicitous and infelicitous referring expressions. The latter 
component tests whether participants can reliably integrate information from the visual and 
discourse context to penalise expressions which fall short of pragmatic expectations to 
provide enough information for unique identification of a referent (Grice 1975/1989), e.g. ‘the 
jar’ in a display containing two jars. Participants viewed displays of four everyday objects 
whilst listening to pre-recorded sentences. They were instructed to click on the item on the 
computer screen mentioned in the sentence. The examiner explained that “sometimes the 
computer uses good Spanish and sometimes it uses bad Spanish. Let’s tell it how good its 
Spanish is to help it learn”. The participant then rated utterances on a scale of 1 to 5, with 
the best utterance indicated by a happy face and the label ‘muy buena’ (very good), the 
worst by an unhappy face and the label ‘muy mala’ (very bad), and the intermediate keys 
marked with the labels ‘buena’, ‘regular’, ‘mala’ and their corresponding facial expressions. 
There were five practice items, followed by 64 experimental trials separated into five blocks.  
 
Items and Experimental Design 
For the production task, 32 arrays were created in two versions: a no-contrast 
display, which contained only one referent of a noun category (e.g. a jar, a snake, a cow and 
a telephone) and a contrast display, which contained two referents of the same noun 
category, differing in one dimension (e.g. an open jar, a snake, a cow and a closed jar; see 
Figure 1a and 1b), thus requiring modification to disambiguate the target referent. Each trial 
comprised four images: a target image and three distracters. These 32 items were split into 
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two equal groups; half of the participants saw the first group of items in a no-contrast display 
and the second group of items in the contrast display while the other half participants saw 
the item groups in the reverse order. Presentation order was counterbalanced across 
participants. The order of items within each group was pseudorandomised and presented 
using Microsoft PowerPoint.  
In the comprehension task, images were displayed in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) and were accompanied by pre-recorded utterances spoken 
by a female native speaker of Spanish. We used a 2(contrast-set) x 2(adjectival 
modification) repeated measures design, creating four conditions: over-informative (a no 
contrast set with modification), under-informative (a contrast set, no modification), optimal-1 
(no contrast set, no modification), and optimal-2 (a contrast set with modification). There 
were 32 critical items, eight in each condition, plus 32 filler items. The filler items were 
descriptions such as ‘click on the animal / furniture / thing you find in the kitchen’. Items were 
pseudorandomly presented, the position of the target referent and the contrasting referent 
was rotated between items in all conditions, and every target item appeared in only one of 
the four conditions between participants. Following selection of target item, participants were 
asked to rate the utterance on a 5-point scale. 
 
Coding Procedures 
There are two ways of being under-informative in this paradigm: omitting a necessary 
adjective, e.g. ‘the apple’ in a context containing a large and a small apple, or producing a 
globally ambiguous RE, e.g. ‘the clothes’ when the target referent is a shoe. Accordingly, we 
used two complementary schemes to code the expressions produced by the participants 
(see appendix for details). The first coding scheme (‘pragmatic’) allowed examination of the 
pragmatic informativeness of utterances by asking whether the referring expression (i) 
provided the listener with enough information to uniquely identify the referent, and (ii) 
provided only the essential information (i.e. no redundant information). Expressions were 
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coded as under-informative (e.g. ‘the apple’ in a contrast context containing one big and one 
small apple), optimal (‘the big apple’ in the same display) or over-informative (‘big apple’ in a 
display containing only one apple). Referring expressions that deviated slightly from the 
anticipated noun, but would lead a listener to resolve reference just as easily (e.g. ‘box’ for 
present) were included in this analysis. Production data were scored by two raters, with 
inter-rater reliability of r=0.98, p<.001 for under-informative codes, r=0.99, p<.001 for 
optimally-informative codes, and r=0.95, p<.001 for over-informative codes. 
The second coding scheme (‘lexical’) identified lexical inadequacies which 
threatened reference resolution, and thus may be more sensitive to language impairment. 
Two points were awarded for accurate responses (e.g. ‘the open jar’ for the target item 
shown in Figure 1b), one point for plausible expressions that deviated slightly from the 
anticipated response (e.g. ‘the open bottle’ for the same item), and no points for 
unacceptable/uninterpretable expressions (e.g. ‘the open box’ for the same item). Inter-rater 
reliability was r=0.99, p<.001. See appendix for further details of how various forms of 
referring expression were scored. 
 
Results 
Background Measures 
As reported in table 1, there were no differences between groups on age, non-verbal 
IQ, or false-belief comprehension. As expected, there were significant group differences on 
all language measures.  Thus our clinical group had the expected profile of children with SLI, 
having pronounced structural language difficulties but relatively better socio-cognitive 
understanding. Although the groups did not differ with respect to age, there was a wide age 
range in both groups; thus we controlled for age in all statistical analyses. 
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Production Task 
Pragmatic coding scheme. 1152 responses were collected (576 from each group). 
In the pragmatic coding scheme, four inaccurate responses from the TD group were 
excluded (e.g. ‘box’ for an item which contained two cups, a teapot and a sweet). Twenty-
seven responses from children with SLI were excluded due to no response, pointing 
response, lexical error, incorrect target, or an adjective-only response provided. The number 
of rejected trials differed significantly between groups, t(34)= -3.86, p<.001, d=1.32. 
As response types are non-independent observations, the analysis focused on rates 
of optimal reference. Using the pragmatic coding scheme, the mean frequencies of optimal 
referring expressions are presented in Figure 2. Results were analysed in a 2 (group: SLI, 
TD) x 2 (contrast condition: no contrast, contrast) repeated measures ANCOVA. All effects 
are reported as significant at p<.05.  
There was a significant main effect of group on mean rate of informativeness, F(1,33) 
= 11.32,, p = .002, η2p = .25, with children in the TD group producing more informative 
referring expressions (maximum 16) compared with children in the SLI group (TD: M=13.5, 
SE=.49; SLI: M=11.2, SE=.49). There was no significant interaction between group and the 
co-variate (age); F(1, 33) = 2.15, p = .15. The main effect of contrast condition was not 
significant, F(1,33) = 3.68, p = .06, η2p = .12, though there was a tendency for more 
informative referring expressions to be produced in the no contrast condition relative to the 
contrast condition (no contrast: M=13.2, SE=.41; contrast: M=11.5, SE=.63). The interaction 
between group and contrast condition was marginal, F(1,33) = 3.35, p=.076, η2p = .10. This 
suggests that whilst both groups provided fewer optimal expressions in the contrast 
condition, this pattern tended to be more marked in the SLI group, as these children were 
less likely to provide a modified noun. 
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Figure 2. Production results: a) Mean frequency of optimally informative referring 
expressions by group and contrast condition (pragmatic coding method). 
 
Children tended not to produce under-informative referring expressions; however, an 
independent samples t-test revealed that children with SLI produced significantly more 
under-informative responses (M=5.6, SD=4.1), relative to TD peers (M=2.1, SD=2.9), t(31) = 
-2.93, d=-1.06. 
Lexical coding scheme. The lexical coding system evaluated the semantic 
accuracy of all responses and highlighted increasing challenges for children with SLI. . A 
repeated measures ANCOVA confirmed a main effect of contrast condition F(1, 33) = 12.34, 
p=.001, η2 = .27, with greater accuracy in the no-contrast condition. There was also a main 
effect of group F(1, 33) = 14.38, p=.001, η2 = .30, and a significant group x condition 
interaction: F(1, 33) = 4.90, p=.034, η2 = .13. The interaction between group and the co-
variate (age) was not significant, F(1, 33) = 3.12, p = .086. Children with SLI produced fewer 
accurate utterances overall (M=45.7, SE=2.0) relative to TD peers (M=55.1, SE=1.5), 
d=1.34. In the contrast condition, children with SLI achieved significantly lower scores 
(M=17.4, SE=1.8) relative to TD peers (M=24.6, SE=1.4). While this pattern is similar in the 
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no-contrast condition, (SLI: M=28.3, SE=0.5; (TD: M=30.5, SE=0.4), the difference between 
groups was attenuated, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the contrast condition, the pragmatic 
infelicity is marked by under-informativeness, as multiple referents require modification of a 
target. In the no-contrast condition, the corresponding pragmatic infelicity is over-
informativeness, since no modification is required. Taken together, the coding systems 
reveal that the children with SLI tend to be under-informative, both pragmatically and 
lexically.  
 
Figure 3. Mean scores on the lexical coding scheme 
 
Comprehension Tasks 
Error rates for 24 critical items (over-informative, optimal-1, and optimal-2 conditions 
were generally low; across 432 trials there was only one error in the entire TD dataset 
versus 19 in the SLI dataset (under-informative items were not included since there is no 
single correct target in this condition). Nevertheless, an independent samples t-test revealed 
that children with SLI were more likely to make errors in target accuracy (M=1.06, SE= .26) 
than TD peers (M=0.06, SE= .06), t(17)= -3.67, p<.005, d=-1.78. Error analysis did not 
 17 
 
reveal a consistent response pattern; 11 of the 19 errors made by the SLI group were same- 
category errors, e.g. clicking on the long sock in response to an instruction to click on the 
short sock, with the remaining 8 being different-category errors, e.g. clicking on the lemon in 
response to an instruction to click on the cushion. Error rates on the comprehension task 
were not associated with any language or social-cognitive measures, probably due to the 
low error rates found in the data. 
Pragmatic judgement ratings are presented in Figure 4. These data did not meet 
parametric assumptions and were therefore analysed using a Mann-Whitney test, with age 
uncontrolled. TD children correctly penalised under-informative items more frequently 
(M=3.23, SE=.29; maximum penalty=5) than peers with SLI (M=2.11, SE=.26), U= 81.5, 
p<.05, r=.42. No significant between-group differences were found for any other condition 
(all Us >147, all p-values > .5). Notably, ratings of under-informative utterances were 
significantly correlated with age within the TD group, r(18) =.66, p= .003, but there was no 
association between age and pragmatic ratings within the SLI group, r(18) = .297, p = .23. 
Despite the SLI group’s apparent insensitivity in the judgement task, within-group 
analyses using Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests revealed that both groups in fact penalised 
under-informative utterances significantly more than optimal or over-informative utterances 
(see table 2). 
 SLI TD 
Comparison 
conditions 
Z p Z p 
under vs. optimal-1 -2.49 <.05 -3.52 <.001 
under vs. optimal-2 -2.94 <.005 -3.52 <.001 
under vs. over -2.60 <.01 -3.52 <.001 
Table 2. Pairwise comparisons for within-group ratings of under-informative 
utterances vs. vs. optimal-1, optimal-2 and over-informative utterances. 
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Figure 4. Mean ratings in the judgement task. Error bars show standard error of the mean. 
Thus, although the SLI group were less likely to penalise under-informative items relative to 
their TD peers, they were in fact sensitive to the pragmatic infelicity, as revealed by their 
higher penalties for this condition relative to the comparison conditions. Children with SLI 
notice the infelicity, but they did not penalise it as heavily as the TD group.  
 
Associations between Referential Communication and Structural Language Skill 
Partial correlations between rates of optimally-informative utterances in the 
production task, ratings of optimally-informative utterances in the pragmatic judgement task, 
and the standardised language measures were analysed, using age as a covariate. Given 
the very low error rates in the comprehension task, it was not possible to explore these 
associations in the comprehension task. Across both groups, there were strong and 
significant correlations between production of optimal utterances in the contrast condition 
and all language measures (receptive grammar, r = .74, p < .001; vocabulary, r = .44, p = 
.008; sentence recall, r = .42, p = .013). However, with the exception of sentence recall (r = -
.06), these associations tended to be stronger in the SLI group (receptive grammar, r = .598, 
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p < .05; vocabulary, r = .45, p = .07); in the TD group, only the association between 
receptive grammar and production of optimal utterances remained significant, r = .78, p <001 
(cf. vocabulary, r = .07; sentence recall, r = -.06).  
Across both groups, performance on the pragmatic judgement task was found to significantly 
positively correlate with both of the language measures that were found to be significant 
above (receptive grammar, r = .53, p = .03; vocabulary, r = .75, p < .001). Again, these 
associations were biased towards the SLI group with judgments correlating strongly and 
significantly with the receptive grammar measure (r =.53, p<.05) and vocabulary (r =.75, 
p<.001), though not with sentence recall (r =.29, p =.26). None of the correlations were 
significant within the TD group, all rs < .315, ps > .22 (see Table 3).  
We also tested for significant differences between group correlations using the Fisher’s r-to-
Z transformation. However, there were no significant differences between any of the 
correlations in the SLI group vs. the TD group (all ps >.1), suggesting that the relationship 
between performance on our tasks and performance on the standardised tests was similar in 
both groups. 
  receptive grammar wisc vocabulary sentence recall 
Optimality in production .60* (.78*) .44, p=.07 (.07) .28 (-.06) 
Judgments of under-informativeness .53* (.41) .75* (.32) .29 (.26) 
 
Table 3. Partial correlations (with age as a covariate) between rates of optimally informative 
utterances in the production task (contrast condition only), pragmatic judgments of under-
informativeness, and standardised language measures. r values for the SLI group are 
shown, with TD  correlations  in parentheses. Correlations marked with an asterisk were 
significant at p < .05. 
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Discussion 
This study measured referential communication abilities in a sample of children with 
SLI in production, comprehension and pragmatic judgements in order to explore 
associations between their referential and language abilities. Our results indicate that 
children with SLI exhibited deficits on all three tasks. Relative to their typically-developing 
peers, they produced more under-informative referring expressions, made more errors in 
identifying the intended target, and penalised under-informative utterances less frequently 
than TD peers, although importantly, they demonstrated some sensitivity to detecting such 
utterances. They also made more errors in choice of lexical expression, suggesting that their 
low performance is symptomatic of a more widespread linguistic deficit. This observation is 
supported by correlational analyses, which demonstrated significant correlations in the SLI 
group between performance on the production task and language ability (receptive grammar; 
vocabulary), and performance on the judgment task and the same measures of language 
ability.   
As predicted, when compared with age-matched TD peers, children with SLI 
produced more under-informative expressions that did not allow unique identification of a 
target referent and they made more errors resolving reference in comprehension. Given that 
children with SLI were as likely as their TD peers to pass explicit tests of false belief 
reasoning, it seems unlikely that challenges with reference reflect a failure to take account of 
the listener’s perspective. Instead, correlational analyses support the suggestion that these 
tasks relied on structural language abilities. These findings are consistent with Bishop and 
Adams (1991), who also reported that children with SLI performed more poorly on a 
referential communication task, were more likely to produce under-informative utterances, 
and that performance was associated with measures of receptive grammar. However, 
Bishop and Adams (1991) argued that the cognitive demands of the task, particularly the 
need to scan a complex visual array and keep in mind distinguishing features of potentially 
ambiguous referents may exceed the processing capacity of children with SLI. Our 
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experiment was not designed to test this possibility; future research may usefully employ 
eye-tracking paradigms to highlight the extent to which children attend to different aspects of 
the visual array and adjust their verbal utterances accordingly.  
We anticipated that the judgement task would be a more directly pragmatic task, and 
that children with SLI would perform more similarly to TD children. In fact, they gave lower 
penalties for under-informative expressions than their TD counterparts. However, they did 
succeed in penalising these constructions appropriately relative to both optimally informative 
utterances and the less serious violation of over-informativeness.  Interestingly, it is in this 
most pragmatically demanding task in which the children with SLI fared best, suggesting 
some relative strength in pragmatic awareness. We conclude that children with SLI differ 
from TD peers in their attitudes towards pragmatic infelicities, not in their abilities to detect 
them.  Notably, while the ability to penalise under-informative utterances improved with age 
in the TD group, this was not the case for children with SLI. This further suggests that 
increasing language ability is an important driver of change in pragmatic competence. 
The performance of the SLI group in this regard is in line with Pragmatic Tolerance, 
the developmental account of nonstandard sensitivity to informativeness violations (Davies & 
Katsos, 2010; Katsos & Bishop, 2011). On this view, typically-developing young children can 
be competent with informativeness (as evidenced by target-like rating using a gradable 
scale), while at the same time tolerant of pragmatic infelicity, for example, incorrectly 
accepting under-informative utterances when using a binary scale. Using a more sensitive 
gradable scale, we found lower penalties for under-informative utterances in the SLI group 
relative to their TD peers, but also found sensitivity within the SLI group to the same infelicity 
relative to felicitous comparison items. This suggests that children with SLI behave like 
younger TD children in not prioritising subtle expectations for optimal amounts of 
information, provided that the referring expression is semantically true.  In other words, faced 
with limited language, mentioning the head noun may be sufficient, rendering the modifier 
optional. Notably, a similar pattern of errors was evident in the production task, in which 
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errors were almost always under- (as opposed to over-) informative. This suggests that the 
pragmatic demands of the task exceed linguistic competence in our SLI group. Lack of 
modification was the most common error type, with the head noun generally preserved. This 
pattern of findings accords with accumulating evidence that while children with SLI 
experience pragmatic immaturities relative to age-matched peers, their pragmatic abilities 
are more in-line with their linguistic capacities (cf. Norbury, Nash, Baird & Bishop, 2004). 
An alternative hypothesis is that referential problems in SLI may be caused by social 
cognitive deficits leading to problems with pragmatics, although such deficits may only affect 
a proportion of children with potential ‘pragmatic language impairments’ (or now, ‘social 
communication disorder’; Norbury, 2014). We would argue against this explanation for three 
reasons: first, performance on the experimental tasks was significantly correlated with 
measures of structural language skill, particularly in the SLI group. Second, our groups did 
not differ in the ability to pass explicit tests of social-cognitive reasoning as measured by two 
classic Theory of Mind tasks. Although false-belief constitutes only one aspect of social 
cognition, it suggests that our SLI group do not have pronounced deficits in understanding 
other minds. While a significant minority of children with SLI failed the false belief task, these 
children also had more severe language deficits, making it difficult to disentangle the effects 
of language and social reasoning on referential communication skill. Third, we guarded 
against a possible subset of children with pragmatic language impairment by requiring that 
our SLI participants did not have a diagnosis of ASD or ratings of significant pragmatic 
impairment by parents and teachers. Of course, further investigation of pragmatic and socio-
cognitive competence is necessary to definitively rule out such an explanation, but in our 
sample, structural language deficit appears to be a more likely contributor to referential 
inadequacy.  
The pragmatic judgement task is demanding in that it requires the listener-rater to 
compare the need for information (based on the visual context) with the actual utterance 
encountered, and then recognise that something is missing. Under a general cognitive 
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account of SLI (e.g. Leonard’s Surface Hypothesis, 1998), children with SLI may be less 
able to integrate simultaneously multiple pieces of information or retain rapidly incoming 
information for sufficient periods to make the necessary comparison between expected and 
experienced input (Bishop & Adams, 1991). The SLI group’s reasonably good performance 
on the pragmatic judgement task suggests that their integration skills were not entirely 
compromised, despite the fact that they performed more poorly on the comprehension task. 
These results may seem contradictory, as one might expect adequate comprehension to be 
a prerequisite for passing the judgement task. However, error rates in comprehension were 
low: 7 of the 18 participants with SLI made no errors at all, 6 only made one error, 2 made 
two errors and 3 made three errors. On this simple task, SLI participants did perform more 
poorly than the TD peers, but understood the utterances well enough to resolve reference 
appropriately on the majority of trials and crucially, well enough to make informed pragmatic 
judgements. 
In conclusion, our results support the view that structural language is a key factor in 
referential ability, and it is such syntactic and lexical impairments rather than a pragmatic 
deficit which challenge children with SLI in this domain. These findings have important 
implications for research with other clinical populations. For example, investigators have 
tended to link pragmatic deficits in ASD to impaired social cognition (e.g. Tager-Flusberg, 
2000), though linguistic ability varies enormously within ASD (cf. Kjelgaard & Tager-
Flusberg, 2001; Loucas et al. 2008). Our findings suggest that language may be an 
important predictor of pragmatic performance in ASD; we recommend that future research in 
ASD investigates the impact of individual differences in structural language competence on 
ostensibly pragmatic, or social-communication, tasks (e.g. Norbury, 2005a, b). In line with 
this suggestion, an increasing number of studies have highlighted that individuals with ASD 
and age appropriate language scores perform comparably to age-matched TD peers on 
pragmatic tasks (Norbury, 2005a,b; Pijnacker et al, 2009; Chevallier et al, 2010). Comparing 
rates of over- and under-informative utterances in different clinical groups will yield novel 
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insights into the underlying skills that support communicative competence. An important 
avenue for future research will be to determine whether improving structural language skills 
will benefit pragmatic language development.  
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Appendix: Coding schemes used in production task 
 
Pragmatic coding scheme: 
 Category of 
expression 
Example Informativeness coding 
1 Feasible 
lexical 
alternative 
‘box’ for 
present 
Coded for informativeness as anticipated noun ‘present’ 
2 Semantically 
related noun 
‘glass’ for jar Coded for informativeness as anticipated noun ‘jar’ 
3 Grammatical 
error 
‘boots’ for 
boot 
Coded for informativeness as anticipated noun ‘boot’ 
4 No attempt ‘don’t know’ Deleted from this analysis; not coded for 
informativeness on the grounds that the hearer could 
not resolve reference. 
5 Deictic 
response 
‘this’ or 
manual 
pointing 
Deleted from this analysis; not coded for 
informativeness on the grounds that the hearer could 
not resolve reference. 
6 Lexical error ‘cheese’ for 
cushion 
Deleted from this analysis; not coded for 
informativeness on the grounds that the hearer could 
not resolve reference to the target.  
7 Incorrect 
target 
‘the boot with 
spots’ for 
striped boot 
target 
Deleted from this analysis; not coded for 
informativeness on the grounds that the hearer could 
not resolve reference to the target 
8 Adjective only ‘spots’ for 
spotty 
cushion 
Deleted from this analysis; not coded for 
informativeness on the grounds that the hearer could 
not easily resolve reference. This is a form of under-
informativeness, but not included in the informativeness 
analysis since the current focus is on the form of noun 
phrases. 
 
Linguistic coding scheme: 
 31 
 
2 points were awarded for: 
 Target response (e.g. the mouth) 
 A feasible lexical alternative (e.g. the lips) 
 Over-informative expressions (e.g. ‘the open mouth’ for a solitary mouth) 
 
1 point was awarded for: 
 Unanticipated but partially discriminating adjective (e.g. ‘the big book’ for the open 
book: the open book covered slightly larger area than the closed one).  
 Semantically related noun (e.g. ‘the dress’ for a tshirt) 
 
0 points were awarded for: 
 No attempt 
 Deictic response (e.g. pointing and/or saying ‘this one’) 
 Lexical error (e.g. ‘the pencil’ for a comb) 
 Incorrect target (e.g. ‘the spotty boot’ for the stripy boot) 
 Adjective only (e.g. ‘open’ for the open fridge) 
 No adjective provided when required, or non-discriminating adjective provided (‘the 
jug’ for a spotty jug) 
 
 
 
 
